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                                                                 Abstract 
In the last twenty years the consensus about memory being essentially reliable 
has been neglected in favor of an emphasis on the malleability and unreliability of 
memory, and on the public’s supposed unawareness of this. Three claims in particular 
have underpinned this popular perspective: That the confidence people have in their 
memory is weakly related to its accuracy, that false memories of fictitious childhood 
events can be easily implanted, and that the public wrongly sees memory as like a 
video camera. New research has clarified that all three claims rest on shaky 
foundations, suggesting there is no reason to abandon the old consensus about 
memory being malleable, but essentially reliable. 
Keywords: False memory; memory accuracy; confidence; lay beliefs 
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          Until recently human memory, although limited in capacity and therefore  prone to 
error once these limitations are exceeded, was seen as broadly reliable. Errors in memory 
were not regarded as compromising the integrity of the system as a whole and its ability to 
guide our behavior. However, there has been an increasing emphasis on the “dark side” of 
memory (Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000) and the public’s supposed failure to understand 
its true nature. Prominently underpinning this view are claims that the confidence we have in 
our memory has little relation to its accuracy, that it is easy to implant false memories of 
events that never happened, and that the public erroneously perceives memory as “like a 
video camera”. We argue that these claims are exaggerated and do not challenge the 
traditional consensus concerning memory accuracy. 
Memory has been seen as partially reproductive, retaining some details unique to an 
event, and partially reconstructive, influenced by knowledge (‘schemas’) derived from prior 
learning (Brewer, 1986). When events are complex or ambiguous, existing schemas can 
shape what is recalled, leading to vivid memories for unexpected objects or events but also to 
false memories for schema-consistent material (Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001). 
People also  make judgements about their confidence in the accuracy and source of their 
recollective experience (Johnson, 2006). To say that memory is reliable is to say that a 
memory held with high confidence is likely to be accurate whereas one held with low 
confidence is unlikely to be accurate (Mickes, 2015). The traditional view on the functioning 
of memory was expressed in comments such as (Schacter, 1996): “On balance…our memory 
systems do a remarkably good job of preserving the general contours of our pasts and of 
recording correctly many of the important things that have happened to us. We could not 
have evolved as a species otherwise” (p. 308).  
The perspective that emphasizes the fallibility and unreliability of memory (Loftus, 2005) 
is exemplified by three sorts of comments. One involves claiming that memory is entirely 
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reconstructive and therefore unsafe (Howe, 2011): “…memories, regardless of whether they 
are formed and remembered in childhood or adulthood, are fundamentally reconstructive and, 
hence, error-prone” (p. 198). Memories are of course ‘reconstructive’ in the sense that 
retrieval involves the reactivation and recombination from disparate brain areas of constituent 
elements, for example from specific brain areas processing vision and audition that were 
engaged while the event was being perceived (Danker & Anderson, 2010). Unlike the 
schema-based concept of reconstruction, however, this neuroscientific use of ‘reconstructive’ 
does not imply anything about the truth or falsity of the resulting recollections.  
Another sort of comment uses the ambiguous term ‘fallible’, e.g. (Lynn & Payne, 
1997) “This shift in emphasis signals an emerging zeitgeist that has developed around the 
idea that memory is fallible, quirky, and essentially reconstructive in nature” (p. 55). 
‘Fallible’ does not just mean that memory is capable of error but can signify that it is liable to 
be erroneous or unlikely to work satisfactorily. The third sort of comment describes memory 
error without an appreciation of overall reliability, e.g. (Zajac, Garry, London, Goodyear-
Smith, & Hayne, 2013) “…well over a century of scientific research shows that memories are 
surprisingly fluid and easily corrupted” (p. 614). These comments encourage an excessively 
pessimistic view of memory. 
Consistent with this perspective, the state of New Jersey issued instructions to jurors 
suggesting that eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable guide to accuracy (New 
Jersey Courts, 2012). In the U.K. Mr Justice Leggatt commented “in everyday life we are not 
aware of the extent to which our own and other people’s memories are unreliable and believe 
our memories to be more faithful than they are” and “the strength, vividness and apparent 
authenticity of memories is not a reliable measure of their truth” ("Gestmin SGPS v Credit 
Suisse," 2013). 
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                    The Relation Between Confidence and Accuracy 
One area in which memory has been particularly held to be unreliable is eyewitness 
identification. A common method of identifying suspects is the lineup, which is generally 
composed of images of the police suspect and fillers. The suspect is either innocent or guilty 
and the fillers are known to be innocent. Witnesses can identify the suspect, select a filler, or 
not make a selection. This process can result in two correct responses (identify the guilty 
suspect or reject the lineup with the innocent suspect) or three incorrect responses (identify 
the innocent suspect, reject the lineup with the guilty suspect, or identify a filler).  
Early reviews summarized the relation between the confidence with which witnesses 
identified a suspect and their accuracy, i.e. their reliability, using a point-biserial correlation 
coefficient and found low (Bothwell, Brigham, & Deffenbacher, 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980; 
Wells & Murray, 1984)  or moderate values (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). 
Importantly, these summaries included decisions made even during the initial, pristine lineup 
test (e.g., Penrod & Cutler, 1995). The analyses correlated a binary outcome (correct versus 
incorrect) with a confidence rating across different participants, effectively averaging across 
levels of confidence. However, this kind of correlation coefficient is capable of masking a 
strong relationship between confidence and accuracy which emerges when the data are 
analyzed using calibration analyses to calculate average suspect and filler identification 
accuracy at each level of confidence (Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996) or confidence-
accuracy characteristic (CAC) analysis to calculate average suspect identification accuracy at 
each level of confidence (Mickes, 2015).  
The ensuing studies show that confidence is undeniably diagnostic of accuracy (Wixted 
& Wells, 2017), whether in laboratory witnesses or real witnesses in a police department field 
study (Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & Wells, 2016). This was the case when fair lineups 
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were administered (i.e., the suspect did not stand out among the fillers). Critically, the finding 
holds solely during the first and only lineup test because confidence can increase over 
repeated testing. In a comparison of available records of the initial identification and the 
courtroom identification from cases that were later exonerated, the initial identification was 
made with low confidence or no identification, but the courtroom identification was made 
with high confidence (e.g., Garrett, 2011). The increase in confidence can happen for various 
reasons, for example with post-identification feedback (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).  
Moreover, the analyses conducted by Wixted and Wells included studies that 
manipulated a variety of variables, including whether or not 1) a weapon was present, 2) 
there was a long or short retention interval, 3) the target was seen briefly or a longer time, and 
4) the target and witness were of the same or different race. In each case initial confidence 
was diagnostic of accuracy. Suspects who were identified with high confidence were likely to 
be the target, but suspects who were identified with low confidence were more likely to be 
innocent. Wixted and Wells concluded that initial confidence is diagnostic of accuracy when 
pristine testing procedures are used. These analyses corrected the earlier message that 
eyewitness memory, when tested on a lineup, is inherently unreliable.  
                               Implanting False Memories of Childhood Events 
The claim that it is easy to implant entirely false childhood memories (Conway, 2013; 
Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002) is repeated on the public website of the Wellcome 
Trust (Hopwood, 2019). This line of research developed in order to demonstrate that some 
memories of childhood abuse, rather than being true, might be the results of suggestion. One 
study reported that it was apparently possible to implant a false memory of having committed 
a crime in 70% of participants (Shaw & Porter, 2015). In these effortful and time-consuming 
studies experimenters target a particular event that a parent indicates did not happen, and then 
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encourage participants to recall over two or three sessions the details of the false event they 
are misleadingly told the parent has confirmed as happening. In some studies participants are 
also shown a doctored photograph that supposedly illustrates their presence at the false event. 
Their accounts are then rated for their correspondence to a complete memory by the 
investigators.  
With the use of such highly suggestive procedures in which participants are 
encouraged to suspend disbelief, it is critical to ensure they have not just accepted that the 
event occurred (i.e., a false belief) and have speculated about the details, but that they 
actually have a recollective experience that they are confident accurately reflects the event 
(i.e., a false memory). Reanalysis of the Shaw and Porter (2015) data suggested that over half 
of the 70% in fact reported false beliefs, not false memories (Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2018). 
All false memory implantation studies find that some participants generate visual images in 
response to the experimental demands but their confidence in them varies greatly. A 
systematic review found that whereas on average 47% of participants were rated as having 
some recollective experience associated with the suggested false event, no matter how vague, 
uncertain or speculative, only 15% of participants were classified as having fully accepted the 
false memory (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). Another more limited review concluded that 11% 
showed evidence of a ‘robust’ false memory, 10.8% a ‘full’ false memory, and 8.5% a 
‘partial’ false memory, reflecting the authors’ decreasing degree of confidence in whether the 
false memory had been successfully implanted (Scoboria et al., 2017, Table 4). 
These figures may be an over-estimate because investigator ratings are a poor 
substitute for participants’ own metacognitive judgements about whether they believe in a 
memory (Shaw, 2018). On the few occasions these judgements have been recorded, adult 
participants’ confidence in clear false memories identified by investigators was below the 
scale midpoint (Hyman & Billings, 1998) and over half were not classified as memories by 
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participants themselves  (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Table 1). Memories of false 
events also consistently have less of a recollective quality and are less vivid than 
corresponding true events (Brewin & Andrews, 2017). The findings correct the notion that in 
the laboratory false memories of childhood events are easy to implant and clarify that only a 
small minority of people are susceptible. In real life the specific circumstances (e.g., 
availability of deceptive information, or opportunity for more extended suggestive influence) 
are likely to be very different but empirical data are unavailable. 
                                  The Notion that Memory is Like a Video Camera 
 The video camera view of memory has been described as “typical” (Lacy & Stark, 
2013) and “pervasive” (Clifasefi, Garry, & Loftus, 2007) among the lay public and non-
experts, as well as being classified among the “50 great myths of popular psychology” 
(Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010). This is puzzling since the public are in a 
sense all experts, having had multiple opportunities to observe and test the workings of their 
own memory. The claims are largely based on answers to a single survey question: “Human 
memory works like a video camera, accurately recording the events we see and hear so that 
we can review and inspect them later” (Simons & Chabris, 2011).  
Survey methodology, however, cautions against the use of single items and warns that 
statements phrased in the positive may be answered differently if phrased in the negative, or 
may be answered differently in another context. Moreover, there are many other metaphors 
that people may use in describing their memory and these may have different connotations. 
 A recent study (Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, & McNeilis, 2019) contrasted 
responses to this video camera statement with alternative statements including “Human 
memory is not like a video camera because we cannot play back events exactly as they 
happened”. The items were designed to probe beliefs in more detail by minimizing 
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expectations about what answers were correct, and by providing items that were not only 
worded differently but gave participants a broader context to consider. In two studies 
significantly more non-expert respondents agreed with the item stating that memory was not 
like a video camera than with the original statement stating that it was.  
Follow-up questions also probed people’s beliefs about memory accuracy and 
completeness in more detail and found that lay beliefs about memory were much more 
nuanced and sophisticated than the earlier research had suggested. Over 90% of respondents 
acknowledged the influence of attentional factors at encoding, and personal beliefs and 
biases, in shaping memory. Many respondents reported subjectively experiencing their 
memory as sometimes like a sequence of unfolding scenes, much like a video recording. 
These findings correct the notion that ordinary people have failed to understand their own 
memory and indicate other plausible reasons for the survey responses obtained. 
                                                              Conclusions 
The claims examined here, repeatedly cited in textbooks and articles, paint a picture 
of memory as being highly prone to error and suggestion to an extent that the public are 
unaware of. All three, however, rest on research with methodological weaknesses that invite 
alternative interpretations of the findings. Re-analysis of this research and the collection of 
new data suggest that more modest conclusions are appropriate. One implication is that 
research on the ‘dark side’ of memory has not yet provided grounds to overturn the long-held 
consensus of memory as essentially doing a good job although limited by its capacity and 
prone to manipulation. Memory is clearly malleable but not unreliable, under normal 
circumstances and in the absence of contamination or prolonged suggestion by psychologists, 
therapists, or anybody else (Koriat et al., 2000; Wixted, Mickes, & Fisher, 2018). 
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Another implication is that psychologists should be much more cautious in assuming 
that their understanding of memory is superior to that of the ordinary person and that 
institutions such as the criminal justice system need educating about research. This may well 
be true in some areas but it fails to consider the possible costs of disseminating findings that 
do not rest on a solid foundation. Ironically, when questioned about the relation between 
accuracy and confidence, non-experts have been found to give answers that are more 
consistent with the latest research than do psychology students, who rather than probing their 
own experiences had been misled by the conclusions in the literature (Brewin et al., 2019). 
Ultimately psychologists are responsible for the way in which our research is 
interpreted by the outside world. There is a real danger that over-enthusiastic championing of 
conclusions based on limited data, without proper regard to methodological caveats or issues 
of external validity, will be damaging both to our reputation as scientists and to potential 
recipients such as the legal profession who rely on us to guide them with restraint and 
impartiality.  
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